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The Emergence of the Kosovo "Parallel State," 1988–1992[1]

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Introduction

This article examines the origins of the nonviolent resistance movement in Kosovo in the early 1990s, with the purpose of explaining the dynamics that led to the emergence of the so-called "parallel state" of Kosovo Albanians.

Though current public images of Kosovo have largely been shaped by the events surrounding the violent conflict of 1999 and NATO intervention, as well as postwar ethnic violence and questions over Kosovo's unresolved status, a critical but largely understudied phase of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo is the emergence of the Albanian "parallel state" during the early 1990s. Analysts largely agree that the ethnic conflict of the 1990s, rather than being a continuation of historical "ethnic hatreds" from past centuries, is part and parcel of the political dynamics that led to the disintegration of the multinational Yugoslav federation.[2] Kosovo being an autonomous province of Serbia and a constituent unit of the Yugoslav federation, the social and institutional contours of the Kosovo conflict were directly shaped by the institutional structures and cultural identities existing in the Yugoslav system. The purpose of this article is to trace the political dynamics that initiated conflict and explicate both the institutional and political reasons why the Albanian response to Serbia's forceful abolition of Kosovo's self-governing status in 1989 led to a nonviolent response, in the form of the parallel state. I argue that the parallel state was a result of constitutional histories, the institutional context, local political dynamics, the nature of Serbia's policy in Kosovo, as well as drastic changes taking place internationally during the period of 1988–1992. I make this point by demonstrating how the "parallel state" was a largely unplanned-for phenomenon, emerging as a result of autonomous acts of various institutional segments, and—at least in its earliest phase—not a conscious political project of the ascending Albanian political leadership.

The Kosovar "parallel state" (sometimes also called the "shadow state" or "parallel society") throughout most of the 1990s consisted of a loose conglomeration of educational and cultural institutions, health services, social assistance networks, political parties, local financial councils, and a government-in-exile, all nominally coordinated by a political center led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova. Not a state in the traditional, Weberian sense, it is here conceptualized as a national movement that sought to preserve the basic framework of a state inherited from the period of autonomy, defy the Serbian state's

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authority by demonstrating a collective political will to protest through civil disobedience, and elicit international support for the goal of secession. This description of the parallel state, however, is based on the political structure that was the outcome of institutional developments between 1989 and 1992; here it is the dynamics that led to this outcome that are analyzed. The other term, "Albanian movement," refers to the nationally defined social movement for secession that emerged in Kosovo in the period 1988–1992. It refers not to a single organization, but rather to the mass-based movement, which included virtually all of Kosovo's Albanian community, which organized collectively under a common political platform through shared collective goals, experiences, and cultural repertoires of contention.

The approach here purposefully breaks with conventional frameworks of ethnic conflict, as developed particularly by international relations scholars. First, the approach taken here breaks with the assumption that ethnic collectivities innately function as social and political units. National identity and the sense of national belonging, or what Rogers Brubaker calls "nationness," is here treated as a contingent historical phenomenon and a property of the political field, constituted institutionally and discursively, and not as a primordial or naturally given property of the ethnic collectivity.[3] Second, the approach taken here situates the Kosovo conflict within the particular historical context of the Yugoslav break-up and the general hopes and uncertainties that emerged in post-Cold-War Europe. The historical approach taken here breaks with models that theorize ethnic conflict within frameworks of strategic action and that carry with them unexamined ontological assumptions and understandings about social reality.[4]

The approach taken here draws heavily from the "process-oriented" approach to social movements, as articulated by scholars such as Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Mayer Zald, and others. Broadly speaking, this school of thought has developed three key factors in explaining the emergence of social movements, defined as sustained collective challenges to elites, opponents, or authorities, based on social solidarities and common goals.[5] Such contentious collective action is a result of the interaction among *political opportunities*, *mobilizing structures*, and *framing processes*.

Borrowing from structuralist approaches to the study of social movements and revolutions, *political opportunities* represent the changes in political opportunities and constraints that produce incentives and disincentives for groups to engage in contentious collective action. These factors are not consistently present in each case of contention, but rather represent a "set of clues," such as the opening of institutional access to groups who have previously been excluded, the emergence of rifts or new alignments within ruling elites, the availability of allies, and decline in the state's will or capacity for repression. Most importantly, these are factors that are *external* to the contending group, and appear to the group in the form of incentives, constraints, and resources.[6] *Mobilizing structures* are defined as "those collective vehicles, both formal and informal, through which people come together and engage

in collective action."[7] While political opportunities may offer incentives for contentious collective action, mobilizing structures are central in bringing individuals together to organize for collective action. Finally, opportunities and mobilizing structures are translated into sustained collective action through *framing processes*, the shared ideas, meanings, symbols, and identities that join individuals together into social movements. In turn, during the course of contention, social movements transform these ideas, meanings, symbols, and identities, or create entirely new ones.[8]

The object of the article, however, is not to intervene in theoretical debates in issues of ethnic conflict, social movements, or the break-up of states. As such, the explication and analysis of causal mechanisms is not its primary purpose. These, however, are implicitly embedded in the narrative; the choice of events, the sequential ordering of objects of analysis, the use of concepts, and the narrative structure itself conceal implicit understandings of causal mechanisms and their primacy over other possible ones. The preceding theoretical discussion was an effort to provide a conceptual framework and make those understandings explicit.

The article proceeds largely in the form of a historical discussion. It begins by briefly discussing the historical origins of the political problems of sovereignty in Kosovo, and why the issue of sovereignty resurfaced as a contentious issue in the late 1980s. Second, it discusses the structural bases of ethnic polarization, as well as the dynamics that led to polarization during the 1980s. It then proceeds to examine the Albanian response to Belgrade's efforts to abolish Kosovo's self-governing status. It analyzes the dynamics of protest, and examines the contingencies that led to the emergence of an Albanian counter-elite that was able to dominate a rising movement and gain control of a newly emerged institutional structure. The historical reconstruction is based on historical sources, newspaper articles, interviews with particular actors, as well as materials drawn from existing sources. As indicated above, the article particularly dissects the events in the period between 1988 and 1992, which is the critical period when the parallel state emerged.[9]

Kosovo and Questions of Sovereignty

In retrospect, it was the institution by Yugoslav communists of a federal system based on the Soviet model in 1945 that gave saliency to questions of Kosovo's constitutional status.[10] The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had, both in the interwar period and during its wartime resistance, given support to various Albanian movements in Kosovo for national recognition. For instance, in 1923, the CPY issued a programmatic statement in which it resolved that the party's duty was to "help the movements of oppressed nations in their goals of creating independent states, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, as well as the liberation of the Albanians."[11] In 1939 it recognized its cell in Kosovo as a separate branch of the

party organization.[12] In 1942, in the midst of war, the Yugoslav communist leader Tito stated that the CPY "will never depart from the principle stated by our great teachers and leaders, Lenin and Stalin, which is the right of every nation to self-determination, including secession."[13] For Tito, this included the Albanians of Yugoslavia.[14] At the end of 1943, the founding conference of the National Liberation Committee of Kosovo—regional political authorities that the CPY had established in all parts of Yugoslavia, which included communists and non-communists alike—adopted a resolution endorsing the union of Kosovo with Albania. The Bujan Resolution, so named because the meeting was held in the small village of Bujan in northern Albania, was strongly reprimanded by the leadership of the CPY. At the end of the war, in 1945, a newly constituted Assembly of the People's District Council, which included Albanian communists but was dominated by Serbs, adopted a new resolution expressing "the wish of the entire population of the district to join a federated Serbia as its constituent part." In the following month the resolution was accepted by the Anti-Fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), serving as the country's postwar government, and in September the National Assembly of Serbia passed a law regulating the status of the autonomous district (*oblast*) of Kosovo, and setting its boundaries.[15] These critical events during World War II would establish Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia, whose constitutional status would undergo several changes up until Yugoslavia's eventual break-up.

The origin of the "Kosovo question" as a direct *constitutional* question within the framework of Yugoslav federalism is thus to be found in the CPY's wartime policies, its nominal commitment to the Leninist principle of self-determination, and its decision to imitate the Soviet model of nationally based territorial divisions in the postwar political organization of Yugoslavia. In the process, the question of Kosovo's status became intricately linked with Yugoslavia's nationalities policy. Although Yugoslavia's six republics were largely conceived as national homelands for the country's major national groups Albanians, already forming the majority of Kosovo's inhabitants, were recognized as a national minority and not as a constituent national group. Throughout the 1950s Kosovo would enjoy a symbolic territorial autonomy, and the Yugoslav secret police, the UDBa, was particularly active in the province in search of "subversive elements" among the Kosovo Albanians.[16]

The UDBa's repressive policies in Kosovo were publicly exposed in 1966, when Tito dismissed his security chief and former right-hand man, Serb communist Aleksandar Ranković, from all official and party posts. The marginalization of the unitarist wing in the CPY, whose main proponent had been Ranković, opened the way for a series of major political and economic reforms, including greater devolution of power and the augmentation of the self-governing powers of the provinces.

Already in 1963 Kosovo's constitutional status within the Serb republic was made symmetrical to that of Serbia's northern province, Vojvodina. In 1968, in a major concession to demands of regional party leaders, the Executive Committee of the

League of Communists of Serbia (LCS) agreed to drop Metohija from the province's name, legalize the use of the Albanian flag, end the use of the Serbian name *Šiptari* to refer to Yugoslav Albanians in favor of *Albanci*, and made the Kosovo party independent.[17] Constitutional amendments passed in 1969 and 1971 revised the constitutional status of the provinces, recognizing them as territorial units at the federal level. Furthermore, federal authorities set up a special federal fund for underdeveloped regions, in which Kosovo got top priority. The most significant constitutional reforms in Yugoslavia, those of 1974, further decentralized the federation and assigned autonomous provinces virtually equal powers to those of republics. The provinces became republics in virtually all but name.[18]

Economic Transformation and Social Crisis: The Riots of 1981 and Their Aftermath

The year 1981 was a watershed both for Kosovo and for Yugoslav politics. At the height of Yugoslavia's economic crisis, massive riots in Kosovo shook Yugoslav politics to its foundations and brought attention to the scale of social and economic problems that had engulfed the province. Intensive, federally funded investments throughout the 1960s and 1970s transformed Kosovo's economic base—from a largely agricultural economy, Kosovo became heavily industrialized, particularly in extractive industries built on Kosovo's mineral wealth. In spite of these measures, however, Kosovo remained poor even by Yugoslav standards. In 1979, per capita income was 30% of the national average, and approximately one-seventh of that of Slovenia, the wealthiest republic.[19] The growth rate of Kosovo's "social product," the measuring standard of economic output in Yugoslavia, was over 50% below the Yugoslav average.

The economic changes did, nonetheless, rapidly transform Kosovo's social structure. The growth of state administration and industrial employment was drawing a large part of the populace away from agricultural work and forming an educated, well-paid stratum of blue- and white-collar employees. However, economic stagnation beginning in the late 1970s meant that job creation could not keep up with the number of new entrants in the labor market. In particular, the swelling of university students meant that many of the nearly 10,000 annual graduates of the University of Prishtina could not find adequate employment after graduation. Besides the growing ranks of the unemployed, which by the early 1980s reached a rate of around 60% and particularly affected those under 25,[20] many Kosovars turned to emigration. During the 1970s around 100,000 Kosovars left to find employment in other parts of Yugoslavia or outside of the country.[21] For those who remained, public administration became a place to find work; employment growth in the administrative sector was faster than that of the industrial sector and it was where a disproportionately high share of central government funds were allocated. By the beginning of 1980, one in every four employed Kosovars was a well-paid civil servant.[22]

Furthermore, demographic changes transformed Kosovo's national structure. While a state census conducted in 1948 showed that Albanians constituted a majority of Kosovo's postwar population, by 1981 the proportion of Albanians grew from around 68% to 77% of the province's rapidly growing population.[23] Demographic growth and measures of positive discrimination to correct for the underemployment of Albanians in the state sector for many Serbs and Montenegrins meant a growing fear of the "Albanianization" of Kosovo. This induced a growing outmigration of Serbs from Kosovo, though in the 1970s Serbs still constituted a disproportionate number of managerial and white-collar workers and a smaller number of the unemployed. They also had on average higher incomes and were disproportionately represented in the party leadership.[24]

Demographic pressures, social dislocation, and the failure of the socialist employment system to secure employment for many of the new entrants in the labor market led to the growing illegitimacy of the system. It could be argued that the riots of 1981 were a manifestation of the burgeoning challenge to the Yugoslav political and economic system; however, this challenge was largely channeled through the frames of nationality policies and the language of constitutional reform. Yugoslav authorities seized on one of the slogans chanted during the protests, "Kosovo Republic," to characterize the riots as motivated by nationalism and "counter-revolutionary" to the ideals of Yugoslav socialism. Though the idea of republic status for Kosovo, or even the secession of Kosovo and other Albanian-inhabited parts of Yugoslavia, was harbored by a variety of clandestine political groups that emerged with every new generation of young educated Albanians, it was, at the time, regarded by the provincial party leadership as politically implausible.[25] At any rate, the riots unleashed a wave of hysteria in the party circles of post-Tito Yugoslavia, and brought about a level of systematic repression unseen in postwar Yugoslavia.[26]

While the Serbian party had raised the issue of what was deemed to be the excessive autonomy of the provinces on several occasions,[27] Serb unitarists in the federal and Serbian parties seized on the 1981 riots and the growing grievances of the Serb minority in Kosovo to push for the recentralization of Serbia.[28] It was in the figure of Slobodan Milošević that these two moments joined together, who used the grievances of Kosovo Serbs to push through a series of constitutional amendments in 1987 that recentralized some of the provincial powers to the Serbian republic. These moves by Serbia were also supported at the federal level, which increasingly began seeing the constitutional overhaul of the country as a cure for the institutional and economic crisis Yugoslavia experienced in the 1980s.[29] For Serbia, the only Yugoslav republic territorially divided into provinces, the reintegration of the provinces was central to this reform platform, and the Serbian party under Milošević made recentralization its main goal. In spite of growing protests, particularly in Kosovo, Milošević pushed through a series of new constitutional reforms intended to reduce the autonomy of the provinces even further. The campaign for reform—accompanied by truculent media attacks against dissenters, populist rallies, and threats

and intimidation against the Kosovo provincial leadership—provoked growing unrest among the Kosovo Albanians, as evidenced by strikes and the growing number of street protests throughout Kosovo.

The events of 1987 and 1988 drove an increasingly divisive wedge between Kosovo's Albanians and Serbs. As Kosovo's Serbs were mobilized by Milošević's radical reform agenda—facilitated in no small part by its nationalist overtones —Albanians became increasingly restive. The decisive moment in Albanian political mobilization came in November 1988, when the miners of Trepça staged a march to protest the constitutional changes and the attacks against the provincial leadership. This protest event was in effect a *defense* of the constitutional principles of 1974 and the provincial leadership in Kosovo under attack by Milošević. As such it subverted the meaning protest events had gained after 1981—as irredentist "counter-revolutionary" activity. This appealed to a whole different stratum of Kosovo's Albanians—not the radical youth and students who had been at the forefront of the 1981 protests, but the working and professional classes of Albanians who were well-integrated into the Yugoslav socioeconomic system and *directly* affected by the political changes threatened by Milošević. The Trepça protest was, after all, a protest of the working class—the class upon which Yugoslav socialism was ideologically premised—and as such more deeply challenged the authorities than the student movements of 1981. The miners' revolt also instilled a deep rift within the provincial party.[30] The transformative moment came in February 1989, when the miners staged a dramatic eight-day hunger strike to demand the resignation of the party leadership, which had, in the preceding months, been replaced by a group of Milošević loyalists hand-picked by Belgrade. In November 1988 the miners' protest incited a massive march by 100,000 Albanians from throughout Kosovo to the capital to protest constitutional changes. The hunger strike of 1989 and the violent response of the regime fundamentally discredited the leadership and the legitimacy of the state; following that event, intellectuals, industrial workers, professionals, and others began more openly to air their opposition to the constitutional changes being pursued by Milošević. The miners' strike opened up possibilities of resistance and dissent which could not be easily suppressed by the traditional repressive measures at the regime's disposal. Peace activist Howard Clark, having interviewed an Albanian writer, observes:

> Until the miners' action, [the writer] suggests, most people felt it was impossible to find a means of struggle that would not lead to war or else they were deterred by possible condemnation within the [Yugoslav League of Communists] or investigation by the police. "After this strike, that was over, people said OK, me too."[31]

1989 and the Emergence of Ethnically Divided Pluralism

Thus far I have discussed the historical reasons why Kosovo's constitutional status was a salient issue in Yugoslav politics, raised periodically as a question within the general problem of federalism in Yugoslavia, and how it became politically

explosive in the 1980s. Following that I have sketched an outline of the major social and economic transformations that took place in Kosovo from the 1960s to the 1980s, and the major events that created the social bases for national mobilization and polarization. I will now more closely discuss the developments after 1989, when the Serbian party led by Milošević undertook a policy of abolishing Kosovo's autonomous powers and effectively shutting out Albanians from official institutional life. In what follows I describe how this policy and the dynamics it generated led to the emergence of the parallel state as a form of a nonviolent resistance against Serbia's takeover.

In 1989 Serbia adopted its first constitutional reforms that began rolling back the autonomous powers that Kosovo had gained from the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. Kosovo was fraught with protests throughout 1988–1989, and dissatisfaction was already high at the time the constitutional reforms were passed. As Kosovo's largely submissive and unpopular provincial leadership remained marginal to the developments, it was other elements of Kosovo's society which came to the fore to speak out against the reforms undertaken by Serbia. Intellectuals and other professionals, housed in Kosovo's state-sponsored cultural institutions and in the state bureaucracy, became increasingly vocal in expressing their opposition to the constitutional reforms, as well as the repressive measures that the authorities had taken against Kosovo's Albanian population. One of the first acts of dissent was the Apeli 215 ("Appeal 215"), an appeal to end repression and Belgrade's political assault against Kosovo's self-government, signed by 215 Albanian intellectuals in February 1989.[32] During 1989 critical views began appearing in state-owned media too, as traditional party censorship began to disintegrate. The open dissent emerging in the ranks of state institutions had been unthinkable in the past; however, the unraveling of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe generated hopes in Kosovo for a "democratic spring" there as well and opened the way for an emerging pluralism that Kosovo had not experienced during five decades of communist rule.

While the pro-democracy Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) had established a branch in Kosovo as early as 1989, the year 1990 marked the emergence of a number of independent political organizations. Kosovo's first human rights groups emerged at the time, as well as an independent trade union resulting from the disintegration of the state-sponsored union organization. However, the most remarkable event was the establishment of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in December 1989. Although its initial role in the framework of the rapidly transforming political system was unclear even to its founders[33]—largely a group of politically inexperienced writers and intellectuals—the LDK rapidly became Kosovo's most massive political organization and, after political pluralism was formally introduced throughout Yugoslavia, its first non-communist political party. The LDK's founding meeting elected literary critic Ibrahim Rugova as its leader, and its membership exploded in the initial months, claimed at the time to number more than half a million.

How did the LDK manage to mobilize such an enormous number of individuals in the span of a few months? The fact is that while the leadership of the LDK came largely from a group of writers gathered around Kosovo's official Writers' Association, what became the rank and file of the organization was largely the result of the transformation of the Socialist Alliance for Working People (SAWP), the regime's official front organization. It was this organizational network that became the LDK's central mobilizing structure.[34]

Sociologists Jim Seroka and Radoš Smiljković, in their 1986 study of the SAWP, call it "an association of associations."[35] It included virtually all citizens and, unlike the Communist League, did not require formal commitment to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and Yugoslav self-management. The SAWP included under its wing virtually all formal and non-formal groups and associations, and its organizational network stretched widely, from professional associations to neighborhood organizations at the village level. In the 1980s, the organization at its various federal, republican, and provincial levels, included around 80% of the country's population over the age 15. It was also one of the central forums where, in accordance with legally established procedures, all proposals for constitutional amendments were open to public discussion. Its mobilizing potency in Kosovo is thus evident, given the contentiousness of these issues in the prevailing political environment.[36] It is largely the result of segments of the SAWP collectively switching their loyalty to the LDK that partly explains the immediate growth of the LDK, as well as the fact that it was the first group to espouse a largely Albanian-centered political outlook fully opposed to Serbia's policies in Kosovo.

While pluralism was taking root in Kosovo, it became, however, extremely polarized on ethnic bases. The new local political organizations were exclusively Albanian, while Serbs and Montenegrins remained tied to the state apparatus, now coming under the direct control of Belgrade. Serbian parties that emerged after single-party rule crumbled in Serbia were primarily branches of Belgrade-based parties, and few expressed opposition to Milošević's policies in Kosovo. Detentions, persecutions, and terror against Kosovo's Albanian population by a now exclusively Serbian police force drove a strong wedge between the populations which short-circuited the possibility of genuine liberalization, as the question of Kosovo's status became the fundamental political issue around which all contention revolved.[37]

Creating the Basis for the Parallel State: The Rebellious Assembly

While during 1990 Kosovar parties remained hopeful that free elections might create opportunities for political change, Milošević would make sure that no such possibility came about. In December 1990 Serbia held its first free elections, while that same year all provincial governing institutions in Kosovo were forcefully suspended or dissolved, making regular elections in Kosovo impossible. Repression and human rights abuse intensified; now Albanians were targeted collectively. This was done

with the introduction of special legal authorizations that permitted the regime to massively lay off Albanian employees from jobs (the majority of which were in state-owned institutions and enterprises), threaten the education system in the Albanian language by forcing Albanian teachers to adopt Belgrade-approved curricula, shut down Albanian-language media, including the only Albanian-language daily, and violently suppress any open manifestation of discontent. This further homogenized Albanians of all socioeconomic backgrounds into a single political block, and indicated that in Milošević's Serbia Albanians represented a politically and socially undesirable lot. The collective stigmatization of Albanians in the 1980s had now become a policy of collective repression and persecution.

With the exception of a few small groups, the main political demand voiced by Albanian parties in 1990 was the reversal of Serbia's constitutional reforms and recognition of the right of Kosovo to become a republic within Yugoslavia. Officially, the desire for sovereignty was proclaimed on 2 July 1990, by the Albanian delegates of Kosovo's provincial Assembly—who had no formal connection with the LDK or any other opposition group. The proclamation was in fact conceived by several activists behind the scene; the LDK leadership was completely unaware of the Assembly's intentions.[38] The move came as a surprise to Belgrade as well, since it believed that it had secured the loyalty of the provincial leadership in toeing its line. However, this rebellious act by the Assembly forged the link between Kosovo's formal institutions and the Albanian opposition groups led by the LDK, turning the formal leadership and the opposition groups into a unified block. Faced by this threat, Serbia responded by suspending the Assembly and all of Kosovo's provincial governing organs altogether, thus establishing direct rule in the province, and reinforced its security presence with more police troops from Serbia. This, however, did not stop the Assembly from carrying out work clandestinely, in a series of acts that ultimately formed the basis for the parallel claims to sovereignty that defined Kosovo politics throughout the 1990s. In a secret meeting in September 1990, the Assembly met in the town of Kaçanik in southeastern Kosovo and adopted the "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo," thereby sealing the political will of Kosovo's Albanians.[39] These acts by the Assembly, considered by the majority of Albanians to be fully legitimate and in compliance with the legal and constitutional order of Yugoslavia, laid the groundwork for the claim to legitimate sovereignty that formed the basis of the parallel state of the 1990s. The clandestine institutions retained the allegiance of Kosovo's Albanians as Kosovo's only legitimate government; Serbia, on the other hand, saw the moves as threatening acts of a secessionist minority that needed to be suppressed by any and all means.

As late as May 1991, at its first congress, the LDK's position was that Kosovo should become a republic within a Yugoslav confederation—a new loose federal order advocated at the time by Slovenia and Croatia. However, the demand for republican status became untenable only a month later, when Yugoslavia entered its first phase of disintegration with Slovenia and Croatia's departure. The LDK, which

had virtually turned into a coalition of a variety of political currents among Kosovo's Albanians, was facing two difficult challenges. First, more radical currents within the party called for radical demands—the unification of all Yugoslav Albanians into a single republic, and their unification with Albania as the rectification of a historical injustice. Kosovar analyst Shkëlzen Maliqi calls this a conflict between "legalists" and "anti-legalists" (a more appropriate term would be "historisists"), the former maintaining that the demand for independence should adhere to some legal basis in the former Yugoslav constitutional order, and the latter viewing the conflict in stark historic terms that demanded radical solutions.[40] Second, the LDK had to strategize its actions based on the rapidly unfolding developments that followed Yugoslavia's disintegration, including the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia and Croatia and the diplomatic intervention of the European Community (EC) and the United States. During the summer of 1991, the LDK partly resolved its dilemmas by making Kosovo's independence its main political objective.[41] Additionally, working with other Albanian parties in the Coordinating Council of Political Parties (CCPP) and the clandestine Assembly, the LDK coordinated the organization of a referendum on Kosovo's independence in September 1991. Throughout 1991, referendums became a prevalent practice among minorities and majorities throughout Yugoslavia to claim the right to self-determination, and Kosovar Albanians organized their own.[42] The referendum, which overwhelmingly displayed the Albanians' popular will for independence, not only gave popular legitimacy to the LDK's goals, but presented Yugoslavia and the West with an unquestionable desire for independence.

The referendum indicated the overwhelming support of the Albanian population for independence. From little over one million registered voters, 99% were in favor of independence. Eighty-nine percent of those registered to vote participated in the secretly organized poll. The referendum was held between 26 and 30 September 1991, four days after the Assembly had adopted a "Resolution on Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo." The Assembly met on October 19, proclaimed the independence of Kosovo and duly amended the Kaçanik constitution to reflect the popular vote for independence.[43] From this point on, the common goal of the Albanian movement—affirmed by "popular will"—became independence. After the referendum, any alternative platform or support for compromises over this issue became tantamount to national treason.

By 1992, Kosovo had developed two irreconcilable political blocs, the regime that introduced a Serbian nationalizing project and was bent on breaking the political will of Albanians by force if necessary, and a popular Albanian secessionist movement that maintained its position that Kosovo was "occupied" and viewed the Serbian takeover as completely illegitimate and the Serbian regime as a colonial authority engaged in brutal repression. These antagonisms reflected not only at the institutional level of politics, but pervaded all social life, thus forming the basis for the segregated, parallel political and social frameworks that Albanians and Serbs maintained in Kosovo during most of the 1990s.

Creating Control: Limiting Counter-Violence

The end of the Cold War and the rapid diminution of Yugoslavia's strategic importance to the West made the country vulnerable to greater pressure to respect international human rights norms. Concerned with the instability in Kosovo, in April 1989 the European Parliament adopted a resolution that condemned Serbia's policies in Kosovo and implored the authorities to abide by international human rights norms. In February 1990, the European Parliament passed another resolution condemning Yugoslavia's human rights violations and urging compromise between the Serbian authorities and Albanian leaders.

During the same period, the U.S. Congress also adopted a series of resolutions that condemned Serbia's policy in Kosovo. The House of Representatives, through a resolution adopted in June 1989, expressed its concern over human rights violations in Kosovo. A similar resolution was passed by the Senate in the following month. In November 1990, the Senate passed its harshest measure to date, blocking U.S. economic aid to Yugoslavia unless the country took measures to respect human rights in Kosovo. In addition, Western media became increasingly interested in the developments in Kosovo, and reports containing horrific tales of police violence were becoming available to Western policymakers and publics through organizations such as Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch (later Human Rights Watch).

The LDK quickly caught on—it was Serbia's violent repression that was bringing Western attention to the Albanians' plight. The LDK, and especially the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), in 1990 began intensifying their human rights monitoring efforts throughout Kosovo, producing daily and monthly reports accounting cases of police violence, brutal treatment of Albanians while in custody, and other cases of ethnically driven maltreatment and violence perpetrated by the authorities.

Human rights monitoring and reporting became a key activity of LDK and CDHRF branches, and in this respect there was an overlap in the interest and activity of the two organizations. The presence of LDK branches and CDHRF activists in virtually all towns and villages throughout Kosovo created a dense network of monitors that could quickly react to any instance of violence in their locality. These individuals were usually prominent members of the local community, and in severe incidents they would be accompanied by delegations from the capital. The monitoring network they were part of had dual purposes. Besides recording cases of police violence, it concurrently served another function, which was to monitor and control the behavior of the local populace so as, first, to ensure that the local community was acting in accordance with the policy set in Prishtina, and, second, to prevent any acts of counter-violence against police action that would fulfill Rugova's worst nightmare of giving Serbia "a pretext to initiate a massive campaign of murder and expulsion."[44]

In larger urban areas, after street demonstrations were discontinued in 1990, police repression eased up and took place in a largely predictable manner. Albanian residents and police learned to coexist and by 1993 achieved a modus vivendi based on the principle that Albanians would be permitted to conduct private economic activity and take part in activities organized by parallel institutions, but they would defer to police authority. However, the situation in rural areas was less tenable. After the removal of autonomy, forces of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MUP) began a campaign of random house raids throughout villages in Kosovo allegedly to search for hidden weapons. The raids, usually conducted as night, were intended to humiliate as much as to actually confiscate weapons, and were accompanied by arrests, beatings, and even the death of family members.[45] Few villagers resisted the raids, but the events constituted the greatest threat of provoking violent reactions by villagers trying to defend themselves. Peace activist Howard Clark describes one such incident, which occurred in December 1991 in the village of Prekaz in the traditionally unruly Drenica region, when villagers fired shots at a police battalion marching into the village. The day after the incident, the village was immediately visited by LDK and CDHRF activists.[46] The activists went to the village with two purposes: first, to report the incident, and, second, to urge restraint among the population.[47] Having been previously proselytized into the movement by activists of the blood reconciliation campaign, villagers were now being monitored by local activists who were overseen by political leaders in the capital. Thus, the LDK established a highly effective system of control that for several years enabled it to maintain the fragile peace and the mantle of nonviolent resistance.[48] As an LDK activist told Clark,

> When the police make incursions into the villages and terrorize them, we—the people of the LDK—try to be the first ones to speak with the police so they can see we are there. For example, we went to Gllogovc when we had been warned. Not to calm the people—that was impossible, the police had already done their work—but to make an act of solidarity, to witness. That's very important. Otherwise, the police or army can take advantage of some piece of stupidity.[49]

Why Nonviolence?

In his work on social movements, Sidney Tarrow writes that protesting groups organize collective action based on "repertoires of contention," a concept he borrows from Charles Tilly.[50] Repertoires of contention represent a set of models for organizing collective action which groups and individuals can draw from and know how to use and implement. Thus, in laying their claims, contending groups can resort to a variety of collective actions, including nonviolent manifestations such as public demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins, or violent acts such as damage of objects, violence against representatives of authority, and terrorism.[51] Drawing from a variety of scholarly research, Tarrow argues that social movements and the forms of protest

they employ are intricately linked with the development of the modern state. Furthermore, forms of protest are "modular," in the sense that, once developed, they spread and are used by a variety of groups with different goals, operating in different geographic localities and under different regimes and national contexts.[52] In addition, movements are not limited to a single form of protest but often employ a multitude of different forms, depending on opportunities, resources, and strategic goals.[53] However, a repertoire that a movement can draw from is usually rather fixed—changes in existing forms are usually only marginal and innovations of new forms are rare.[54]

In the early 1990s, the "repertoire of contention" found in Kosovo consisted of three major forms of protest: public demonstrations, strikes, and guerilla attacks against law enforcement agents. By 1992, nearly all of these types of public protest ended, were stifled, or, as in the case of guerilla attacks, became marginal. By 1992, the parallel state had taken its institutional shape and gained a popularly supported leadership, and the LDK claimed ultimate authority in all political matters within the Albanian movement. The Albanian movement came to be known both locally and internationally as a nonviolent resistance movement—with Rugova gaining the mantle of an "Albanian Ghandi"—which defied Serb authority by maintaining a set of parallel institutions.

Why did all forms of public protest subside and the maintenance of parallel institutions become the only form of defiance? Or, to put it another way, why was armed resistance never seriously considered as an option in 1990–1992? The answer to these questions is key to explaining the Albanian movement's strategic commitment to nonviolence.

As indicated above, in the 1990s three forms of public protest were typically practiced in Kosovo. With the exception of guerilla attacks, the other forms of protest were conventional, nonviolent types of protest.[55] Consequently, the marginalization of guerilla attacks meant that the chances of armed conflict being provoked by the Albanian side were greatly reduced.

Although small guerilla groups existed in Kosovo in the early 1980s, these disintegrated through either weak organization, the lack of weapons, or the murder or imprisonment of militants.[56] During 1987, for instance, organizations such as the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK) staged guerilla attacks and various acts of sabotage against the authorities.[57] However, clandestine groups such as the LPRK were on the fringes of Kosovar politics. Repressive measures taken after 1981 took a toll on many underground activists, weakening their organizations. In addition, many former underground activists had joined mainstream parties such as the LDK (although these were not necessarily individuals who had been involved in or supportive of violence), causing tensions between the latter and those who continued operating in clandestine groups. In 1989 and the early 1990s, clandestine groups were in no position to gain popular support. Their influence among the youth—the segment of the population most likely to be involved in violent

acts—was also curbed by public groups such as the Youth Parliament, which was active in the organization of nonviolent protest events.[58]

Disagreements arose between the LDK, on one hand, and the Youth Parliament and other groups, on the other, concerning the organization of nonviolent protest events. Borrowing from symbolic protest events that became prevalent in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Youth Parliament organized a series of nonviolent protest events such as the petition "For Democracy, Against Violence," symbolic demonstrations where protestors carried an empty casket to symbolically "bury the violence," and protests against curfews by knocking on pots and pans and shaking keys during curfew hours. The LDK's objections to such events resulted in the stifling of initiatives such as these, and, soon after, public demonstrations subsided.

The Youth Parliament and other groups that were organizing peaceful protest events were the first to introduce forms of action that are by most standards considered genuine acts of nonviolent protest and resistance. Strikes were another form of nonviolent protest that took place. The protest march of Trepça miners in November 1988 and the miners' hunger strike in January 1989 triggered a series of solidarity strikes in enterprises throughout Kosovo. From November 1988 to September 1989, strikes or other work halts occurred in 230 enterprises in the province, with a loss of nearly two million labor hours.[59] Strikes became the chief weapon of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK). In September 1990, the BSPK called for a one-day general strike to protest the firing of 15,000 Albanian workers. The general strike halted work throughout Kosovo and demonstrated a powerful show of solidarity. However, the strike failed to achieve its aims; rather, Serbia responded by firing an additional 5,000 workers.[60] By 1991, Serbia had dismissed nearly 150,000 Albanian workers, representing 90% of the employed workforce.[61] By instituting such drastic measures, Serbia pulled the plug on strikes and arrested the political power of the BSPK.

Serbia's repressive policies and the LDK's stifling of initiatives resulted in the cessation of public protest events. The main reason why the LDK wanted people off the streets was its fear of massive reprisals, which was Rugova's consistent personal fear.[62] In addition, the fledgling Albanian movement was beginning to gain sympathy among the publics in the northern Yugoslav republics and Western policymakers precisely due to its nonviolent nature, which would have been jeopardized by any endorsement of violence. Furthermore, the LDK was able to control counter-violence through the institutional mechanisms of control it had developed, as discussed above.

Moreover, the option of full-blown armed resistance became largely impracticable due to the inability of former provincial defense forces to organize into a resistance movement. In 1989, Serbia disbanded Kosovo's Territorial Defense force and in 1990 it removed most Albanians (around 3,500) from the provincial police force. In 1991, a group of former defense employees attempted to form a secret defense force, but the effort failed.[63] During the same period, a group of former

police working under the cover of their trade union operated as a shadow police force. However, their efforts also ended in 1994, when around 200 of them were arrested and tried for attempting to set up a parallel ministry of the interior.[64] While there is speculation concerning whether any of these groups could have been successfully transformed into an armed force if they had been managed properly and provided with sufficient financial and political support, Rugova's lack of political will to organize a defense force and preference for a passive policy were important factors that thwarted its realization.[65]

Hence, with virtually all opportunities for armed resistance removed and Rugova's firm position in maintaining a policy of passive resistance, there appeared little opportunity for an armed uprising. As Maliqi writes, "the strategy of nonviolence was somehow self-imposed as the best, most pragmatic and most efficient response to [Serbia's] aggressive plans."[66] It was also self-imposed because, realistically, the means to respond to Serbia's takeover with an orchestrated campaign of violence were extremely limited, and because Rugova's fear of reprisals muffled any serious initiatives to prepare for armed struggle. In addition, the strong solidarities and the LDK's elaborate network of activists ensured that no violent incident would get out of hand.

Resilient Institutions

As indicated previously, the Assembly and other provincial governing institutions were part of a larger framework of political, economic, and cultural institutions operating in the province. Besides its government and administrative apparatus, each republic and province in Yugoslavia had its own set of intricately linked and state-supported economic, social, and cultural institutions.[67] While this fact alone illustrates why the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy concerned not only its government and administration but the entire institutional structure of the province, it also presented Milošević with an additional challenge of reintegrating the province into Serbia's political and administrative system after Kosovo's self-governing powers had been removed. As these institutions were staffed and led mostly by Albanians who were against the abolition of Kosovo's self-governing powers, Belgrade faced the problem of bringing these institutions in line with its policy of reintegration. Belgrade's solution was odiously simple: by using an obscure republican law, it instituted so-called "emergency measures" in all organizations, and then demoted or fired all those who did not or potentially would not abide by Belgrade's policies. In the economic sector, if one discounts economic losses, this policy proved successful as Serbia took control over most Kosovar enterprises. In other sectors, especially education, Belgrade's policy would have an unexpected consequence. Namely, Belgrade's expulsion of Albanian personnel en masse resulted in their regrouping and the reconstruction of the institutions from which they had been removed. The

resilience of institutions in the face of suppression is therefore the key factor that led to the creation of Kosovo's parallel social organization.

As argued by the Kosovar legal scholar Esat Stavileci, the expulsion of Albanians from their jobs was chiefly a political act without a sound legal basis. In examining official dismissal warrants, he finds political beliefs or activities to be the main grounds for dismissal.[68] As such, more than the loss of a job itself, revulsion was provoked by the fact that workers were dismissed on the basis of their nationality, which resulted in the strengthening of solidarity and the commitment to collectively resist Serbia's takeover.[69] Resistance was chiefly organized through the establishment of parallel institutions (or, in the view of those organizing them, the *legitimate* institutions of Kosovo). While such resistance was practically impossible in the case of enterprises, it was possible in institutions where public services were the main activity (see Table 1 for a list of affected institutions).[70] There were mainly two sectors that successfully organized sustainable parallel structures: education and health care. Given the purposes of this paper, here I only trace the emergence (rather than the evolution) of parallel organizations and the factors that enabled their sustainability in the short term.

Parallel Education: Teachers against the State

The first conflict between Serbian authorities and schools in Kosovo began in 1990, when the Albanian teachers refused to abide by a new curriculum adopted by the Serbian Ministry of Education and continued to use the old curriculum set by the dissolved provincial authorities.[71] In 1990, Serb authorities paid Serb teachers double the salary they paid Albanian teachers, then in February 1991 they completely stopped paying salaries to Albanian teachers. Furthermore, according to the Ministry's plans for the 1991/1992 school year, less than 30% of Albanian students finishing primary school would have the opportunity to enroll in secondary schools, while there were 700 *more* slots available for Serb students than there were primary school graduates.[72] The first closure of an education facility also occurred in 1990, when the Serbian Assembly passed a law that resulted in the closure of the Medical Faculty of the University of Prishtina. In August 1991, 6,000 secondary school teachers and 115 principals were dismissed, and at the start of the 1991/1992 school year the authorities used police to prevent Albanian students from entering school premises.[73]

The key actors behind the organization of parallel schools were the Alliance of Albanian Teachers (LASH) and the Independent Teachers Union (SBASHK). Barred from entering school buildings, students went to classes set up in makeshift classrooms in private houses, basements, and garages, among other locations. While initially seen as only a temporary measure, the parallel school system was the only alternative remaining after the authorities prevented Albanian teachers and students

TABLE 1 Institutions closed down or taken over by Serbian authorities

Municipality	Institutions					
	Economic	Educational	Health care	Cultural	Media	Total
1. Prishtina	62	16	22	4	4	108
2. Mitrovica	26	5	3	—	1	35
3. Peja	25	—	7	—	1	33
4. Ferizaj	19	—	2	—	1	23
5. Gjilan	18	—	4	—	1	23
6. Prizren	10	1	1	—	—	12
7. Lipjan	11	1	—	—	—	12
8. Kamenica	7	2	1	—	—	10
9. Gjakova	10	—	—	—	—	10
10. Vushtrri	8	1	—	1	—	10
11. Deçan	9	—	1	—	—	10
12. Rahovec	5	1	1	—	—	7
13. Klina	6	1	2	—	—	9
14. Podujeva	3	—	2	—	—	5
15. Dragash	5	—	—	—	—	5
16. Kaçanik	4	—	1	—	—	5
17. Skënderaj	4	—	1	—	—	5
18. Viti	4	—	1	—	—	5
19. Istog	2	—	—	—	—	3
20. Suhareka	3	—	—	—	—	3
21. Gllogoc	1	—	—	—	—	1
22. Malisheva	2	—	—	—	—	2
23. Shtime	1	—	1	—	—	2
Total	245	28	49	6	8	338

Source: Pajazit Nushi, "Krimet kundër njerëzisë dhe gjenocidi kundër shqiptarëve," in Esat Stavileci and Nushi, *Të vërteta për Kosovën* (Prishtina: Lidhja Shqiptare në Botë, 2000), p. 109.

from entering school buildings in 1992.[74] Primary education was less targeted than secondary education. Out of 441 primary schools, 41 functioned in alternative premises, while 60 out of 66 secondary schools operated outside of their original facilities.[75]

The University of Prishtina also became a target of the Serbian authorities. After closing the Medical Faculty, Serbia instituted a series of measures in 1991 to purge the university's 13 faculties, removing all Albanian teaching staff and promoting or installing Serbs in their place. This turned the university into an exclusively Serbian institution. After being barred from university buildings in 1991, the Albanian employees of the university reorganized in alternative makeshift facilities, catering for nearly 20,000 students.[76]

Health Care and the Emergence of Other Parallel Structures

"Emergency measures" that were used against education were also introduced in the field of health care and resulted in the removal of Albanian medical staff from their jobs. The measures were first introduced in 1990 and ended with the closure of clinics and hospitals. Thirty-eight clinics were closed in Prishtina alone.[77] While a complete reorganization of health care following the steps taken by the schools was practically impossible, doctors began engaging in a variety of activities in order to offer medical services to Albanians, who were apprehensive about using Serb-controlled hospitals.[78] While many doctors turned to private practice, the first large-scale organization to offer free medical services was the Mother Teresa Association (MTA), formed in 1990. In 1992 MTA established its first clinic, and by 1998 with the help of international humanitarian organizations nearly 350,000 people relied on MTA for medical assistance and aid.[79]

A variety of cultural and social organizations also continued to operate. While it had its funding discontinued, the Kosovar Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Institute of Albanology continued to function in their original premises until 1994. In addition, several other formerly official institutions, such as the Institute of History and the Institute of Language and Literature, also continued to operate and publish, although in a much smaller capacity. Although oftentimes prevented by police, sports events were organized and leagues were maintained. Albanian-language media also survived efforts to shut them down. After the shutting down of Radio-Television Prishtina there were no longer any Albanian-language broadcasts, but the daily *Rilindja* was resurrected through the transformation of the farmer's magazine *Bujku* into a daily newspaper, while the youth magazine *Zëri i Rinisë* was transformed into a political weekly.[80] The appropriation and transformation of existing institutions at a pace that the state itself could not keep up with became the tactic for resisting Serbia's attempts to fully expel Albanians from institutional life.

Although not necessarily centrally controlled, the activities of parallel institutions were placed under the aegis of the Republic of Kosovo, operating under its ministries and with certain sectors receiving financial support. The instances of institutional resistance were taking place within the context of the Albanian movement and its efforts to deny legitimacy to the Serbian takeover. As collective acts of resistance they derived their rationale and symbolic meaning from that movement. At any rate, it is important to emphasize, as Maliqi does, that "the parallel institutions of Kosovo all pre-date 1990," and that they are "a legacy of the earlier system."[81]

Rounding off the Parallel State: The Elections of 1992

As indicated above, throughout most of 1991, the LDK had an ambiguous policy and was marred by internal disputes. Its ignorance of the Assembly's plans to deprive Serbia of a clean victory in tearing down Kosovo's autonomy by acting defiantly

meant that it was the provincial institutions, and not the LDK, which defined the framework of contentious issues and the strategy that would be pursued. And while the LDK dominated politically, it was nonetheless only one among many contenders on the stage of Kosovar Albanian politics. The Assembly continued to consist of LCY-era delegates, while the LDK's only claim to the mantle of legitimacy was through Rugova's chairing of the CCPP—an organization where the LDK nonetheless had to maintain a degree of consensus over general issues of strategy. The elections of 1992 bestowed the LDK—and Rugova personally—with unchallenged control over the shadow Republic of Kosovo, and, therefore, the parallel state and the Albanian movement.

In 1992, Yugoslavia was no more. After the EC's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991, the U.S. revised its policy of supporting the maintenance of Yugoslavia and in April 1992 recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent states. During the same year, armed conflict engulfed Bosnia-Herzegovina and the EC boosted its efforts to manage the break-up. The definitive dissolution of the Yugoslav federation opened up the opportunity for the Albanian movement to intensify its claims for Kosovo's independence. The LDK considered Western intervention to be crucial in attaining its goal.

While the Albanian movement's nonviolent posture had gained it sympathy from Western policymakers, they did not support independence. The Kosovar government-in-exile applied for recognition to the EC in December 1991, but its request was refused based on the recommendations of the Badinter commission, which ruled that only republics were eligible for statehood.[82] Nevertheless, through the efforts of a vibrant Albanian-American lobby, it appeared that momentum for independence was gaining ground in the U.S. Congress.[83] In November 1991, and then again in January 1992, Senators Alphonse D'Amato and Larry Presler introduced resolutions in the Senate recommending the recognition of Kosovo's independence and supporting competitive elections in Kosovo.[84] In April, after the U.S. recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, several high-ranking senators, including the leading Republican senator Bob Dole, raised the issue of human rights violations in Kosovo. On the same occasion, Senator Pressler called for the inclusion of the Kosovars in the EC's Brussels peace conference, free elections in Kosovo, and the recognition of its independence. Bujar Bukoshi, Kosovo's prime minister in exile, intensified his diplomacy in the first few months of 1992, meeting high-level officials in Denmark, The Netherlands, Austria, Turkey, and the U.S.[85] While elections became important for the consolidation of the Albanian movement, they also became necessary for giving more weight to the demand for recognition and became a legitimate endeavor because they enjoyed international support.[86]

The elections confirmed the LDK's and Rugova's overwhelming popular support and their uncontested position in leading the Albanian movement. In the secret polls held on 24 May 1992, the LDK received 76% of the votes, gaining 96 out of the 140 seats in the shadow parliament.[87] Rugova, running unopposed, received 99% of the

vote. The elections were also legitimized by the presence of a number of foreign observers, including U.S. congressional staff and reporters from over 100 foreign media organizations, who stated that the elections had been largely regular. While Serbia did not prevent the vote—the likely reason being that Milošević wanted to avoid additional Western reprimand on top of the condemnation he was receiving because of the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina—it called the elections illegal and dispersed the meeting of the new parliament a few days later.

Figures in the Albanian movement who differed with Rugova on strategy and other issues, such as the Parliamentary Party leader Veton Surroi and nationalist writer and LDK critic Rexhep Qosja, said the elections were "not free," but stopped short of opposing them, calling them demonstrations of popular will against Serbian rule.[88] However, this did not prevent the LDK from cementing its control over the Albanian movement. Pluralism—in its relative sense—became meaningless as the CCPP ceased to function and other parties were completely marginalized. Contrary to Rugova's statements prior to and immediately after the elections, the parliament and government were never established as standing institutions.[89] This enabled Rugova to wield full personal control, both politically and according to the authority he enjoyed based on the nominal legal norms of the shadow "Republic of Kosovo".[90] The LDK became the sole legitimate authority, both at the central and municipal levels; according to Rugova, "the LDK also functions as the local authority because with the party it is easier to organize life."[91]

Three factors contributed to the LDK's electoral victory. First, the LDK enjoyed massive popular support. Having inherited Kosovo's autonomy-era mass organization structures, it was by far the largest party. In addition, Rugova's personal popularity had soared and was unchallenged by any other individual in the movement. His charisma and soft-spoken demeanor, Western support, and the LDK-controlled media turned him into a cult-like figure within Kosovo. Second, the party controlled the main media outlets, most significantly the daily *Bujku*, which was the only Albanian-language daily in Kosovo. Finally, the LDK was the main organization standing behind the elections. If it were not for the LDK's elaborate organizational structure, there would have been no elections of that scale. However, at the same time, this undoubtedly created a degree of bias in the polls.

The elections completed the institutional framework of the parallel state. After 1992, a series of other steps enabled the parallel state to become sustainable. These included the collection of a voluntary tax from Albanian business people by LDK-controlled financial councils established throughout Kosovo. A voluntary tax was also collected by the government-in-exile from Albanian immigrant communities in Western Europe and the U.S., usually through the efforts of LDK branches formed throughout these communities. The money was used to support the LDK's work and to provide the salaries for teachers and other activists of the parallel state. As the government remained in exile and the new parliament held not a single meeting, the LDK through Rugova, who was now dubbed the President of the

"Republic of Kosovo", became the sole authority in all matters within the Albanian movement.

Conclusion

In her analysis of the collapse of socialist regimes, Valerie Bunce argues that socialism collapsed under its own weight—the institutions that were meant to guarantee socialism's survival ended up subverting the regime.[92] The very same process, it can be argued, caused the emergence of the parallel state in Kosovo: institutions that were meant to guarantee the survival of the state ended up subverting the authority of the state itself. The parallel state was a result of the resilience of autonomy-era institutions much more than of intentional planning by Kosovo's rising political counter-elite, in particular the LDK. Today the territorial claims over Kosovo continue to be cast in a variety of meta-historical terms, with both sides vying to correct ethno-political injustices of previous historical eras. Nevertheless, the particular contours that the conflict took in its earliest stage are most clearly understood in terms of the institutional framework inherited from the socialist era and the specific political dynamic that precipitated and followed the final unraveling of the federal state.

Of the factors discussed in this article, three stand out as crucial in having contributed to the emergence of the parallel state. First, the creation of strong solidarities *within* but not *between* national groups during the late 1980s formed the social bases for parallelism. Second, the political opportunities created by the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the emerging pluralism in political life made it possible for the first non-state groups to emerge, and these groups were, due to political circumstances, defined by nationally oriented agendas. Finally, the incredible resilience of autonomy-era institutions in spite of severe state repression, spearheaded by the rebellious actions of the provincial Assembly, created the conditions of split sovereignty that became the basis for the parallel state and the Albanian movement's demand for a restoration of autonomy, and, after Yugoslavia's disintegration, independence. These developments structured the dynamics of a conflict that lasted, in the form of the parallel state, throughout the 1990s.

NOTES

1. The arguments found here are in the most part derived from Besnik Pula, "Contested Sovereignty and State Disintegration: The Rise of the Albanian Secessionist Movement, 1988–1992," MA thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, 2001.
2. See, for instance, Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington: Brookings, 1995).
3. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 13–22.

4. For an example of an analysis of ethnic conflict based on models of strategic action see Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). As the reader will notice, the approach taken in this paper does not preclude the possibility of strategic behavior; however, it assumes that such behavior can take place under particular institutional conditions—which must themselves be subject to historical analysis—and that its sphere of possibilities are limited by previously shaped identities and cultural repertoires.
5. For a summary see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, "Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolutions," in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
6. See Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially pp. 71–80. The quote is from p. 18.
7. McAdam *et al.*, "Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolutions," p. 155.
8. See *ibid.*; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*. See also Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1–22. The component of the theoretical edifice that I do not embrace here is the largely social psychological approach to "framing," or identity formation among members of collective movements. In *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), D. McAdam, S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly make efforts to overcome this problem in the overall framework, but without great success in explicating the cultural and symbolic processes that go into identity construction. I prefer to think of identities themselves being historically embedded and emerging within contexts infused by power relations. For an alternative approach to framing see Marc Steinberg, "The Talk and Backtalk of Collective Action: A Dialogue Analysis of Repertoires and Discourse among 19th Century English Cotton Spinners," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 105, No. 3, 1999, pp. 736–780.
9. The parallel state carried on until the war of 1999; however, the political dynamics of parallelism between 1993 and 1999 are not the subject of this article.
10. In contemporary usage, the geographic term "Kosovo" (Albanian *Kosova* or Serbian *Kosovo-Metohij*) is used to refer to both a current and a historical entity. However, it is important to emphasize that Kosovo as a territorially bounded administrative unit emerged only in 1945. The advent of a regional government in Kosovo was a direct result of the federal territorial arrangements that emerged in post-1945 Yugoslavia ruled by the CPY.
11. Quoted in Radošin Rajović, *Autonomija Kosovo: istorijsko-pravna studija* (Belgrade: Ekonomika, 1985) p. 85.
12. It should be noted that the request for separation from the Communist Party of Montenegro was made at a time when the regional party for Kosovo was dominated by Montenegrins. See Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), p. 92.
13. Quoted in Michelé Lee, "Kosovo between Yugoslavia and Albania," *New Left Review*, No. 140, 1983, p. 77.
14. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 77.
15. Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje*, p. 92; Lee, "Kosovo between Yugoslavia and Albania," pp. 85–86. The boundaries were reportedly set on "ethnic and historic" criteria. It is clear that the criteria in the case of Kosovo were more or less arbitrary; Albanian-inhabited

parts in Montenegro and western Macedonia were left outside of the frontiers, whereas historically the Ottoman province of Kosovo included large chunks of the Republic of Macedonia and the Sandjak region.

16. Immediately after the war, Kosovo was placed under military administration, to fight Albanian insurgents in the Drenica region and "reactionary elements" active in the province. The military administration was removed in 1946; however, various repressive measures continued to be exercised in Kosovo, with Albanians representing a particular target. An especially brutal episode was the so-called arms collection campaign of 1955–1956, in which hundreds of mostly Albanian homes were raided in the search for weapons. "Ethnic cleansing" was also attempted. During the 1950s, Tito's security chief, Aleksandar Ranković, made efforts to revive a 1938 treaty between Yugoslavia and Turkey to expel 40,000 Muslim (largely Albanian and Turkish) families from Kosovo and Macedonia to Turkey. See in particular Bojan Korsika, *Srbija i Albanci: pregled politike Srbije prema Albancima od 1944. do 1989. godine*, Vols 1–3 (Ljubljana: Casopis za kritiko znanosti, 1989). For an English translation of the text of the Yugoslav–Turkish agreement see Robert Elsie, *Kosovo: In the Heart of the Powder Keg* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1997), pp. 425–434. According to the Kosovar demographer Hivzi Islami, by 1966 around 230,000 Albanians had left Yugoslavia. For a discussion of the agreement between Ranković and Turkey see Hivzi Islami, "Kërkimet antropogjeografike në Kosovë," *Gjurmime Albanologjike: Seria e Shkencave Historike* (Prishtina), Vol. 1, 1971, pp. 115–162.
17. The term *Šiptar* is now considered by Kosovo Albanians a derogatory name. In the 1950s and 1960s Belgrade made attempts to distinguish between Kosovo Albanians and Albanians of Albania, by calling the former *Šiptari* and the latter *Albanci*. This policy ended in the 1960s.
18. For a detailed discussion of Yugoslav federalism see Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
19. Elez Biberaj, "Kosovë: The Struggle for Recognition," in *The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982), p. 33.
20. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, pp. 50–57.
21. Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Other Albania: Kosovo 1979*, Part 1 (Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff, 1980), p. 10.
22. Patrick F. R. Artisien and R. A. Howells, "Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots," *World Today*, Vol. 37, No. 11, 1981, pp. 421–422.
23. According to Yugoslav census counts taken in 1948 and 1981.
24. For instance, in 1974, out of the 128,000 employees of the state sector, 36% were Serb and Montenegrin, while nearly 39% of managerial positions were held by Serbs. Disproportionate Serb and Montenegrin representation was also evident in administration. Out of 251 presidents of administrative agencies, nearly 38% were Serbs and Montenegrins. See Biberaj, "The Conflict in Kosovo," p. 46. According to statistical data from the 1980s, Kosovo Serbs were still employed in greater proportion to their population than Albanians, their income was higher, and they comprised a smaller percentage of the unemployed. While according to one survey Albanian households in 1989 had on average nine members with only one person permanently employed, Serb households had five members, out of which two had permanent jobs (see Slavko Gaber and Tonči Kuzmanić, eds, *Zbornik: Kosovo—Srbija—Jugoslavija* [Ljubljana: Krt, 1989], p. 288). Official employment data showed that in 1986, when Serbs and Montenegrins constituted less than 15% of the total population, they constituted 25% of the total employed workforce (see Rexhep Ismajli, "Albanski jezik u Jugoslaviji," in Slavko

Gaber and Tonči Kuzmanić, eds, *Zbornik: Kosovo—Srbija—Jugoslavija* [Ljubljana: Krt, 1989], p. 95). In 1981, in terms of per capita income, the income of Serbs was 24% greater than that of Albanians. Albanians were the poorest group in Yugoslavia and, after the Croats, the second poorest in Kosovo itself (based on data in Julie Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 24). In 1970, 1980, and 1981, the vast majority of the unemployed in Kosovo were Albanian. Out of those unemployed in the given years, on average 77% were Albanians, while 16% were Serbs (excluding Montenegrins). Montenegrins were the fewest among the unemployed, with an average of 2% for the years indicated (according to data in Mertus, op cit., p. 28).

25. Author's interview with Fadil Hoxha, Prishtina, July 2000. Hoxha was a leading figure in Kosovo's communist leadership and chaired the committee that drafted the proposals for constitutional amendments in 1968. Hoxha stated that his personal view at the time was that Yugoslavia was not prepared to accept Kosovo as a republic, and rather sought to gain republican powers for the province while maintaining its provincial status. Another Kosovar party leader who was involved in the discussions over Kosovo's status, Mahmut Bakalli, in an interview in 1995 stated that while the Kosovar leadership hoped to gain republic status, they were aware of the constraints. He notes that the stability of Yugoslavia was for them a greater concern than the desire to get republic status (see Momčilo Petrović, *Pitao sam albance šta žele, a oni su rekli: republiku ... ako može* [Belgrade: Radio B92, 1996], pp. 12–20).
26. The paranoia that the riots induced in the party leadership is exhibited by the statement of Stane Dolanc, a member of the Central Committee of the LCY: "behind [the riots] lie the most reactionary forces in the world, fascists, and the most dogmatic [communists], which at this time have probably united and formed a single platform. And that platform is the destabilization of Yugoslavia. ... We will deal in the same manner with any display of nationalism ... [and with] whomever is linked to international reactionary circles of the right or of the left, pro-fascist or pro-dogmatic, pro-Informbureau elements" (quoted in Spasoje Daković, *Sukobi na Kosovu* [Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1984], p. 300). The image of an internationally unified reactionary-nationalist-fascist-Marxist-Leninist conspiracy to destroy Yugoslavia was the "sum of all fears," which all combined to signify the "enemy within" who needed to be dealt with forcefully. The *point de capiton*, the bludgeoning stereotype of this discourse which combined an impossible array of conspiracies into a single embodied enemy became "Albanian irredentism," which in 1980s Yugoslav public discourse became the catch-phrase representing all of Yugoslavia's ills, stigmatizing Yugoslavia's Albanian minority as one of the central threats to the integrity of the country and, for Serb nationalists in the CPY, the perpetrators of "genocide" against the Serb minority in Kosovo. The juridical side of this discourse was the persecution of Albanians for the most bizarre reasons, such as for naming children "nationalist names," for not playing non-Albanian music at weddings, or for having expressed admiration for Enver Hoxha's Albania. On the events of 1981 see Mertus, op cit., pp. 17–46. One of the most insightful critiques of the growing discourse of hate against Albanians in public institutions is Fehmi Agani, "Kriticki osvrt na politicki diskurs o Kosovu i Albancima," in Gaber and Kuzmanić, op cit., pp. 111–135. Another discussion is found in Muhamedin Kullashi, "The Production of Hatred in Kosovo (1981–91)," in Ger Duijzings, Dušan Janjić, and Shkëlzen Maliqi, eds, *Kosova/Kosovo: Confrontation or Coexistence* (Nijmegen: Peace Research Centre, 1997), pp. 56–69.
27. Dissatisfaction with the high degree of autonomy the provinces enjoyed surfaced as early as 1977, in the so-called "Blue Book" drafted by the Serbian party leadership. After the

events of 1981, measures were taken to re-establish republican control over provincial governments. In 1984, the Serbian party published an elaborate proposal for reform, which included the revision of the 1974 constitution. In the following year, the Constitutional Court of Serbia annulled a series of decrees that sought to insure the national composition of the provincial leadership was proportional to the population, which had effectively secured Albanian dominance in the provincial government. See Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise* (New York: Routledge, 1999), especially p. 9.

28. Though there was undoubtedly a perception of intimidation and threat among Kosovo Serbs during the 1970s and 1980s, there is no evidence of systematic, institutionalized attempts to force Serbs to migrate out of Kosovo, as claimed by the Serbian leadership at the time and maintained by some Serbian scholars. A strong but empirically unsupported argument of systematic discrimination of Kosovo Serbs in the period 1970–1989 is found in Marina Blagojević, "The Migration of Serbs from Kosovo during the 1970s and 1980s: Trauma and/or Catharsis," in Nebojša Popov, ed., *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000). Nonetheless, the issue was masterfully exploited by elements of the Serbian party to advance internal power struggles. On those struggles, particularly in relation to the rise of Slobodan Milošević, see Nebojša Vladisavljević, "Institutional Power and the Rise of Milošević," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2004, pp. 183–206. For evidence on the connections between Serb protest groups in Kosovo and the Serbian party leadership and the top-down engineering of acts of revolt see Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 34–35.
29. Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), especially pp. 221–3.
30. It took until January 1989 for the provincial party to decide on the character of the miners' protests, and the haggling between local, provincial, and republican party organizations revealed the growing disunity between different segments of the administration in their perception of Albanian protests. See Aziz Abrashi and Burhan Kavaja, *Epopeja e minatorëve* (Prishtina: Koha, 1996), pp. 25–30. See also Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 233.
31. Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 53.
32. The text of the appeal is found in Harillaq Kekezi and Rexhep Hida, eds, *Ç'thonë dhe ç'kërkojnë kosovarët*, Vol. 1 (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1990), pp. 7–14. The list of signatories practically represents a who's who list of Kosovar politics of the 1990s. Out of those who signed the petition, at least 65 were detained and imprisoned in the subsequent months.
33. In its early phase the LDK was an ill-defined organization, it did not have a legal status, since there was no law on opposition parties, and initially its name included the description "Political, Social, and Cultural Association." Rugova's statement to the Voice of America soon after the organization was formed indicates the LDK's untypical position. According to Rugova, the LDK "at the moment is a political and cultural association. In the future we shall see that, when these issues of political pluralism are legalized here in Yugoslavia, it may even become a political, cultural [*sic*] party, etc" (Kekezi and Hida, *Ç'thonë dhe ç'kërkojnë kosovarët*, Vol. 2, p. 16). Rugova later claimed that the LDK was not a party but a movement.
34. Details of the LDK's foundation are found in a book by one of the LDK's founders, Mehmet Kraja, *Vitet e humbura* (Tirana: [no publisher], 1995), as well as Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 66–67. On the

role of official academic associations in the formation of political parties see Shkëlzen Maliqi, *Kosovo: Separate Worlds* (Prishtina: Dukagjini, 1998), pp. 26–27.

35. Jim Seroka and Radoš Smiljković, *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), p. 80.
36. Nikë Gjeloshi, former provincial secretary of the Kosovo SAWP, provides ample evidence that illustrates the extent to which opposition to the constitutional reforms was aired in SAWP chapter meetings throughout the province during 1989. See Gjeloshi, *Kosova në udhëkryq '89* (Gorle, Italy: Editrice Velar, 1997).
37. Albanian police officers were massively laid off from the service in 1990.
38. The move was largely conceived by Kosovar legal scholar Gazmend Zajmi, who authored the text of the "Declaration of Sovereignty" proclaimed that day by the Albanian delegates of the Assembly. Zajmi was not a member of the LDK. See Shkëlzen Maliqi, "Why Did Kosovo's Nonviolent Movement Resistance Fail?" unpublished manuscript, 2001, p. 9.
39. For the text of the document see *Kushtetuta e Republikës së Kosovës* (Zagreb: Dielli, 1990).
40. Maliqi, "Why Did Kosovo's Nonviolent Resistance Movement Fail?" p. 9. Compare the legalist argument for independence in Gazmend Zajmi, *Vepra I* (Prishtina: Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosovës, 1997), especially pp. 143–164, and the historicist approach in Rexhep Qosja, *Çështja shqiptare: historia dhe politika* (Tirana: Toena, 1998), especially pp. 287–316. Although neither Zajmi nor Qosja was a member of the LDK, their arguments are representative of both schools of thought.
41. Denisa Kostovičová, *Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986–1996* (Keele, England: Keele European Research Centre, 1997), p. 40.
42. See Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, pp. 199–222
43. Gjeloshi, *Kosova në udhëkryq '89*, pp. 143–4; Kostovičová, *Parallel Worlds*, p. 31.
44. See Ibrahim Rugova, *Çështja e Kosovës: bisedë me Marie-Françoise Allain dhe Xavier Galmiche* (Peja, Kosovo: Dukagjini, 1994).
45. For example, in 1995, over 2,324 households had been searched for weapons (Kostovičová, *Parallel Worlds*, p. 53).
46. The LDK's version of the incident is found in "Barbarët në Prekaz," *Illyria*, 4 January 1992, p. 2. In an interview with *Illyria*, Rifat Jashari, one of the family members present during the police raid, confirms that the LDK's and CDHRF's mediation helped avoid bloodshed. See "Rrethimi i tretë," *Illyria*, 22 February 1992, p. 4. Rifat is the brother of Adem and Hamzë Jashari, who in 1998 were massacred together with 28 members of their family by Serb police, in a raid similar to that of 1991. The massacre triggered the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army and turned the Jasharis into martyrs.
47. Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, p. 1.
48. Ample evidence of this is found in *ibid.*
49. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 59.
50. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p. 30.
51. See *ibid.*, pp. 91–105.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 37–42.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 98–103.
55. Although demonstrations in 1989 and 1990 did sometimes contain violence, the overall character of the protests was largely nonviolent. See Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo.*
56. Judah, *Kosovo*, p. 110.

57. As testified by Xhavit Haliti, a key activist in the LPK (interviewed in "Në vitin 1985 nis lëvizja guerile e Kosovës," *Zëri* [Prishtina], 5 February 2001, p. 5).
58. Maliqi, *Kosovo*, p. 32.
59. Gjeloshi, *Kosova në udhëkryq '89*, p. 92.
60. Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, p. 76.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
62. Illustrating his fear that nonviolent protest events would provoke a Serbian backlash, Rugova stated in 1994 that "under these circumstances, we cannot organize even peaceful manifestations because it has become exceptionally dangerous to venture out on the streets" (quoted in Rugova, *Çështja e Kosovës*, p. 141).
63. The key protagonists, including the shadow defense minister Hajzer Hajzeraj, were arrested and imprisoned in 1993. On the activities of Hajzeraj's group, see his interview in *Zëri* (Prishtina), 26–27 February 2001.
64. Judah, *Kosovo*, pp. 87–89. On the parallel interior ministry, see also the interview with Avdi Mehmeti, leader of the "interior ministry" group, in *Zëri* (Prishtina), 4–13 December 2000.
65. Judah, *Kosovo*, p. 87–9. See also Rugova's admonishment of organizing armed resistance in Rugova, *Çështja e Kosovës*, pp. 124–9.
66. Maliqi, *Kosovo*, p. 101.
67. Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 70–78.
68. Esat Stavileci, "Ecje përgjatë historisë politike të çështjes së Kosovës," in Esat Stavileci and Pajazit Nushi, *Të vërteta për Kosovën* (Prishtina: Lidhja Shqiptare në Botë, 2000), pp. 34–38.
69. At least this is how dismissed workers *perceived* the rationale behind their dismissal.
70. I.e., with only the manpower available, one cannot reorganize a factory outside of its premises. However, through the maintenance of union organizations, workers maintained organized networks and pressed their claims for reinstatement. The strength of these organizations became apparent in 1999, after NATO forced Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo, when former employees rushed into former workplaces, demanding their jobs back or re-establishing socialist-era enterprises.
71. Prior to 1990, curricula were adopted by the provincial Secretariat for Education. See Pajazit Nushi, "Shkatërrimi i arsimit, i shkencës e i kulturës shqiptare dhe i sistemit institucional të tyre nga sunduesi serbomadh," in Bardhyl Çaushi, ed., *Rrënimi i autonomisë së Kosovës* (Prishtina: Shoqata e Pavarur e Juristëve të Kosovës, 1992), pp. 73–74.
72. Nushi, "Shkatërrimi i arsimit," p. 74–76.
73. Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, p. 96–97.
74. Initially, the authorities responded to the setting up of parallel schools by repression. Police actions in the period 1991–1993 resulted in the death of 18 students, two teachers, one principal, and three parents. Two thousand teachers and principals and more than 400 students were maltreated by police, while 140 teachers and six students received jail sentences of 20 to 60 days (Clark, *ibid.*, p. 100). Furthermore, in the early start of parallel schools, teachers worked without pay. In 1993, the government of the Republic of Kosovo began paying teachers token salaries (*ibid.*, pp. 102–104).
75. *Ibid.*, p. 98. A factor that played a role in Serbia's targeting of schools for closure was undoubtedly the sheer number of primary students. There were nearly 300,000 Albanian primary school students, and closing all primary schools down would be an immense task for the authorities. Figure from Denisa Kostovičová, "Kosovo's Parallel Society: The

Successes and Failures of Nonviolence," in William Buckley, ed., *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions* (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2000), p. 130.

76. There was a gradual decline in enrolment from 1991 to 1992. In 1996/1997 enrolment fell to 13,805 full-time and part-time students. Figures from Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, p. 101.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
80. Albanians relied on foreign broadcasts and a satellite TV program broadcast from Tirana, established in 1993 with funding provided by the Kosovar government in exile.
81. Quoted from Maliqi, *Separate Worlds*, p. 182.
82. However, there was skepticism among the Kosovar leaders that the request would actually be granted (see "Kosovo Formally Appeals for EC Recognition," *Illyria*, 28 December 1991, p. 1). A copy of Bukoshi's letter requesting independence was reprinted in "Kosovo Asks EC for Recognition," *Illyria*, 18 December 1991, p. 1, while the text of the formal request is reprinted in "Republika e Kosovës kërkon njohjen e pavarësisë," *Illyria*, 28 December 1991, p. 1. Five U.S. Congresspersons sent a letter to EC envoy Lord Carrington supporting the Kosovars' request (copy in "Republika e Kosovës duhet të njihet," *Illyria*, 15 January 1992, p. 3).
83. For brief background on the Albanian-American community and its political movements see Fron Nazi, "Balkan Diaspora I: The Albanian-American Community," in William Buckley, ed., *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions* (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 132–135.
84. "Kërkesë për njohjen e republikave që shpallen sovranitetin," *Illyria*, 16 November 1991, p. 2, and "D'Amato kërkon nga SHBA njohjen e pavarësisë së Kosovës, Kroacisë, Sllovenisë ...," *Illyria*, 1 February 1992, p. 2.
85. "Crowd Hails Bukoshi at JFK," *Illyria*, 23 November 1991, p. 1; "Bujar Bukoshi në Danimarkë," *Illyria*, 22 February 1992, p. 1; "Alois Mock priti Bujar Bukoshin," *Illyria*, 29 February 1992, p. 1; "Bukoshi Meeting U.S. Leaders," *Illyria*, 4 March 1992, p. 7.
86. Besides the support from the U.S. Congress, an April 1992 resolution of the European Parliament also endorsed elections for Kosovo ("Ç'thuhet në rezolutën më të re të Parlamentit Evropian për Kosovën," *Illyria*, 29 April 1992, p. 9).
87. Twenty-three political groups, including two ethnic minority parties, and over 500 candidates contended in the elections. 721,554 voters participated in the polls, comprising 87% of the total number of registered voters. The LDK received 96 seats out of the 98 single-member districts, while the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK) and the Bosniac Party of Democratic Action (SDA) got one each. The remaining 42 seats were distributed proportionally to the LDK (15), PPK (12), SDA (4), and Turkish People's Party (1). Ten seats were reserved for Serb representatives. See "Nesër në Kosovë mbahen zgjedhjet e lira," *Illyria*, 23 May 1992, p. 1; "Rugova Elected in Massive Turnout," *Illyria*, 27 May 1992, p. 1; "Rezultatet përfundimtare të zgjedhjeve," *Illyria*, 27 May 1992, p. 1; Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, pp. 83–84; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, pp. 259–261; Maliqi, *Kosovo*, pp. 39–40.
88. Surroi's remarks are quoted in Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, pp. 83–4, Qosja in "Sulm mbi regjimin militarist," *Illyria*, 27 May 1992, p. 12.
89. See interviews with Rugova in "Ne kemi legjitimitet për zgjedhje të lira në Kosovë," *Illyria*, 16 May 1992, p. 12, and "Bota e di çka do të thotë okupim," *Illyria*, 27 May 1992, p. 12. The government continued to function in exile and wielded no real authority in Kosovo.

90. Weeks prior to the elections, the Assembly had passed a series of amendments to the Kaçanik constitution, giving the president a series of special powers. See "U shpall ligji kushtetues për zbatimin e amandamenteve II–IV në kushtetutën e Republikës së Kosovës," *Illyria*, 16 May 1992, p. 9.
91. Quoted in Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, p. 84.
92. Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).